MAP 1 Overview of South Vietnam. During the latter part of 1965, the 25th Infantry Division was alerted to deploy to Viet Nam. On December 24, 1965, the advance party for the 25th Division arrived in the Republic of South Viet Nam. It was decided that the 25th Division's 3rd Brigade would be deployed to Pleiku in the central part of South Viet Nam. The 2nd Brigade and the remainder of the division were to be deployed to Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province, located between the City of Saigon and the Cambodian Border. The main body of the 2nd Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, arrived at Vung Tau, South Viet Nam on January 18, 1966. The 2nd Brigade Command Post was initially located in the area of Saigon University. Company B, 1st Bn 503 Bde, 173rd Abn Div was under the operational control of the 2nd Brigade Task Force and supplied the perimeter security for the Task Force. The 2nd Bn 27th Infantry supplied 9 rifle squads to Co B, 1/503rd Inf to reinforce the perimeter security of the staging area. The 1st Bn 27th Infantry and the 1st Bn (M) 5th Infantry were on standby to furnish 3 rifle squads each to Co B, 1/503 rd Infantry, should they be needed. Controlled issue of ammunition for the 2nd Brigade Task Force was to be maintained. Only those personnel occupying perimeter defensive positions and ambush sites were supposed to be issued ammunition. On January 22, 1966 an Operations Order was issued to alert units to prepare to move to the area of Cu Chi. Movement was to be in 4 segments. The first segment on January 25; the second on January 27; the third on January 29 and the fourth at a date to be determined. The 1st Infantry Division (Reinf) was given the assignment of receiving, staging and deploying the 2nd Brigade 25th Infantry Division to the base area near Cu Chi. The 1st Division was to coordinate security during movement to, initial occupation of, and development of the Cu Chi base camp area. The 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was assigned to clear and secure the initial base area near Cu Chi not later than 1200 hrs on January 25, 1966. The 25th Infantry Division of the Army of the Republic of South Viet Nam (ARVN) was assigned to secure Highway 1 from the area of the Cau Bong Bridge to the road junction of Highway 8A near Cu Chi during the movement of the 2nd Brigade Task Force convoys. On January 25, 1966 at 0930 hours, Task Force Jack, consisting of one company from the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry , one battery from the 1st Bn 8th Artillery, Companies B and C of the 65th Engineer Battalion and the advance parties from 2nd Brigade units departed the staging area near Saigon University and proceeded to an assigned assembly area at Cu Chi. After the arrival of TF Jack at Cu Chi, elements of the 1st Infantry Division continued to receive small arms (SA), automatic weapons (AW) and mortar fire. The Viet Cong (VC) in the area were operating in small teams and attempted to maintain continual harassing activities against friendly forces. TF Jack units were moved into assembly areas in the vicinity of their assigned sectors. The 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division was responsible for the security and defense of the area and orders were issued that strict fire discipline was to be observed by all units. The firing of weapons by TF Jack units was not permitted during the period that the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division had responsibility for security of the area. On January 27, 1966, at 0830 hours, Task Force Queen, consisting of the 1st Bn 27th Infantry, the 2nd Bn 27th Infantry, the 1st Bn 8th Artillery(-), the 2nd Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company (-), and elements of the 2nd Support Bn, proceeded from the staging area near Saigon University to Cu Chi. On January 29, 1966, at 0830, hours Task Force King, consisting of the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry(-), The 2nd Brigade HHC Rear element, and elements of the 2nd Support Bn began movement to their assigned assembly area at Cu Chi from the staging area near Saigon University. Meanwhile at 0700 hours, the 1st Bn 27th Infantry began relieving the 1st Bn 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division and assumed their perimeter defensive positions. They also provided extraction zone security for the 1st Bn 28th Infantry. At 1200 hours, the 2nd Bn 27th Infantry began relieving Company B, 2nd Bn 2nd Infantry, 1st Infantry Division and assumed their perimeter defensive sector. A secure extraction zone was also provided for Company B, 2nd Bn 2nd Infantry. There were 5 tunnel systems that had been located in the area by the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division soldiers. Some of the information passed on from the 1st Division soldiers to soldiers of the 2nd Brigade 25th Infantry Division was to beware of hand grenade booby traps marked with a red dot somewhere on the handle as this indicated the grenade had been short fused by the VC and should be destroyed in place. Also rice bags in the area have been found to be booby trapped, and snipers have been firing at them from trees and spider holes. On January 30, 1966, an operation began with the purpose to expand and clear the base camp perimeter. At 0815 hours, two companies from the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry passed through the lines of the 2nd Bn 27th Infantry and attacked outward. The 2nd Bn 27th Infantry with Company B, 65th Engineers followed, sweeping and clearing the area and destroying tunnel complexes that were located. During the five day operation 20 tunnel complexes, some as long as a half mile were located and destroyed. Booby traps of all sorts were used by the Viet Cong to inflict casualties. On January 31, 1966, a booby trap was detonated killing two men from Company B, 1st Bn(M), 5th Infantry. The event emotionally jolted some the men of the company and impressed upon them that this was the real thing. Not training, not practice. Soldiers get horribly wounded and disfigured in wartime. Soldiers die in wartime! These were people you knew, if only by sight. One moment they are laughing, talking, breathing, living and the next moment they are very horribly dead. How thin and delicate the thread between life and death is, was a lesson soon to be indelibly implanted in the consciousness of the soldiers of the battalion. Some wondered who would be next. During January 1966, two Bobcats died in Viet Nam. They were: Armando Tesillo and Dan R Shearin . They were the second and third Bobcats to die in Vietnam. The first was Jerry W. Osborn who was killed on April 1, 1965 while TDY from the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry as a helicopter door gunner. Map 2 and Map 3 1966 Operations Maps. The 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry soldiers continued to improve upon the defensive positions in their area of the base camp perimeter. This included clearing the thick vegetation growth out to the banks of the Ben Muong, a stream that ran across the front of the portion of the perimeter that the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry was assigned to occupy and defend. The men of the line companies lived in the bunkers and fighting positions, washing with water taken from local wells. They got as used to the mosquitoes, bugs and other various local critters that they had so far encountered as well as one can get used to such things. On February 3, 1966 the last element of the 2nd Brigade Task Force closed into the Cu Chi base camp area from the staging area near Saigon University. There were no major convoy incidents during the movement of the entire task force. Patrols, ambushes, 3 to 4 man Claymore teams, out posts (OPs), listening posts (LPs), sniper-killer teams, all became a part of normal life for the soldiers of the battalion. Mistakes were made and lessons were often harshly learned. Extremely rare, if nonexistent, was the combat soldier who did not, at one time or another, make a mistake, of one sort or another. Unfortunately, when a mistake was made in a combat situation, someone usually ended up getting wounded or killed. Not always, but often enough. On February 11, 1966 a man from Company B was shot and killed while examining the kill zone after a nighttime ambush was tripped. No one used a flashlight after that. On February 14, 1966 was a busy day for the medics and the Dust-offs. At 0530 hours, Company A prepared to depart the base camp area and to move across the Ben Muong on a dismounted Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) of the area beyond the stream. An element of Company B secured the stream-crossing site to be used on the operation. They were in place at 0530 hours. Company A crossed their line of departure at 0630 hours. A platoon from Company C was positioned beyond the Ben Muong to act as a security force for Company A’s route of withdrawal, should it become necessary and also as a left flank security. At 0745 hours, the Company C security platoon received several rounds of small arms fire but sustained no injuries. At 0935 hours, the Company C platoon again received small arms fire. In the exchange four men were wounded. One was hit in the head and another in the hip. By 1019 hours all four had been Dusted-off. Company A was making slow but steady progress on their sweep, destroying houses and tunnels and finding rice caches. By 1100 hrs they had sustained 10 wounded. Then two Chicom Claymores were command detonated by the Viet Cong, killing 8 and wounding 3 in the vicinity of XT 643176. Four of those killed were from Company A. Two were forward observers from Battery C, 1st Bn 8th Artillery, and two were non-combatant photographers. At 1430 hours, Company A began their return back to the base camp. By 1630 hours the Company C security element had recrossed the stream on the fringe of the base camp perimeter. Also on February 14th, a platoon from Company C was attached to the 2nd Bn 27th Infantry for a clearing operation. At 0837 hours, a man from Company C was injured when he fell on a punji stake. At 1030 hours, the Company C “angel” track (Medical Armored Personnel Carrier) hit an Anti-Tank (AT) mine at XT 632158. The vehicle was disabled and a number of VC attacked from the south in an attempt to capture the vehicle. They were driven off by the track commander and driver firing the .50 caliber machine gun and an M-79 grenade launcher. Several men were later wounded by sniper fire while extracting the downed vehicle. There had been some mention concerning what was considered a slow reaction time of the Dust-offs (medical evacuation helicopters) during the day, but in situations like that minutes can appear to be hours. The medics and doctors were not miracle workers. They did the best they could with what they had. In many instances they performed their duties above and beyond the normal requirements of their responsibilities. Among the Bobcat casualties for the day were 4 killed from Company A and 1 killed from Company C. Wounded were 5 from HQ Company, 15 from Company A, and 3 from Company C. The casualties of members of supporting units were reported and carried on the parent unit rosters. On February 18, 1966 the First Platoon of Company C began a raiding mission at 0100 hours. All 18 members of the raiding party were volunteers. They crossed their line of departure (LD) at about 0115 hours and the Ben Muong at 0130 hours. After crossing the stream they moved through dry rice paddies for about 900 meters, stopping some 25 meters short of the wood line, where they set up security. Sp/4 Fernandez and the squad leader went into the wood line on a brief reconnaissance of the area. At about 0235 hours Sp/4 Fernandez and the squad leader returned and the party moved forward into the rubber plantation for about 300 meters. The raiding party set up a perimeter and SP/4 Fernandez and the squad leader went out on another reconnaissance of the area. When they returned to the raiding party they stated that there was nothing to raid. The party then moved back about 100 meters and set up in a line perimeter near a graveyard (XT 178654), where they were going to wait until moving back to the base camp at 0900 hours. At about 0700 hours, contact was made with some VC on the left front. The M-60 machine gunner on the left flank opened fire, killing 3 of the Viet Cong. Immediately the entire patrol came under intense enemy small arms, automatic weapons and grenade fire. At this time the M-60 gunner was shot and killed. The left flank was pushed back about 20 meters. Sp/4 Fernandez and the medic moved forward in an attempt to rescue the M-60 gunner. Three more men came out to help them. The gunner was picked up and the group started to move back when the man carrying the M-60 gunner was shot in the left leg. Everyone hit the ground and returned fire. Grenades and small arms and automatic weapons fire from the VC was intense. Sp/4 Fernandez observed a grenade land amongst his small group. He accidentally kicked the grenade when he attempted to move away and it rolled nearer to the wounded soldier. Sp/4 Fernandez yelled a warning and dove onto the grenade and smothered the blast with his body, saving the lives of those around him. Artillery and mortar fire was called in on the enemy positions around the patrol. Tactical air strikes with napalm were also summoned. The remainder of the 1st Platoon of Company C made their way out to the patrol. At that time the raiding party moved back to the rice paddy area at the edge of the woods. Sp/4 Fernandez was laid on the ground and the wounded man he saved was laid next to him. The wounded man held Sp/4 Fernandez’s hand and talked with him. Sp/4 Fernandez told him he was hurting. The Dust-off arrived and the wounded along with the dead M-60 gunner were evacuated. The man with the leg wound was placed next to Sp/4 Fernandez at the hospital. The next time he looked, Sp/4 Fernandez was not there anymore. The wounded man asked the doctor about SP/4 Fernandez but the doctor would not tell him anything. The 1st Platoon of Company C returned to the base camp perimeter by 0935 hours. SP/4 Daniel Fernandez was later posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions. On February 22, 1966, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry arrived at the Cu Chi Base Camp Area. While the priority of the 2nd Brigade was the continued expansion and improvement of the Cu Chi Base Camp area, a three day mounted search and clear operation was conducted by the 1st Bn(M) 5th Infantry. Their mission was to search and clear a wooded area located some 1500 meters southeast of the Cu Chi base camp, running from coordinates XT 674135 to 698118. They were then to provide security for six ARVN bulldozers that were to level parts of the area. The 1st Bn, 49th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) was to attack and operate in the southeastern portion of the objective area (XT 698113). The 1/5th Mech crossed the line of departure (LD) at 0830 hours, attacking with Companies A and B abreast. Recon Platoon screened the left (west) flank. A platoon from Company C was to search and clear the wooded area centered at XT 677118. Company C(-) was held in reserve. All units experienced continual sniper fire during the initial advance. At one point the Recon Platoon received intense small arms(SA) and heavy machine gun (MG) fire which was returned with organic weapons, mortar and artillery fire. Extensive tunnel systems were located in the vicinity of XT 688120. The battalion formed a night defensive perimeter at XT 688119 and spent the night at that location. Nine ambushes were deployed, two of which made contact with the enemy. On February 23, 1966, six tanks from the 3/4 Cavalry joined the battalion. The day consisted of search and clearing operations with only light sniper fire being received. A lone sniper firing incident was the only enemy contact made on February 24th. After conducting a final sweep, the battalion closed back to Cu Chi base camp at the end of the day. The area that had been searched during the operation was found to be heavily fortified with trenches, small bunkers, tunnels, mines and booby traps. An estimated platoon of VC were in the operation area. The battalion suffered casualties of 5 Bobcats killed and 18 wounded. The battalion also reported one of its first incidents of a friendly fire casualty when a man received a gunshot wound to his left buttocks. It was noted in the battalion operations summary that "Troops are unnecessarily exposing themselves in the APCs by sticking their heads and bodies too far out of the tracks." During February 1966, Fourteen Bobcats died in Viet Nam. They were: Safford S. Pye; Robert O. Cantrell; William A Hoos Jr.; Gene C. Milligan; Joseph T. Benton; Daniel Fernandez ; Richard H. Cassube; James L. Fain; Billy B. Day; Gary W. Garis; William B. Parnell; Ira C. Boggs Jr.; and FOUR whose names are unknown to us who are writing this work. 1. Sidney John Elyea 2. Douglas Dwight Alley 3. Donald Edward Daniels 4. Walter Norris Ammons Map 4 Cu Chi Base Camp and the "Filhol." "He knew no one and no one knew him. He had no friends here, no confidants. He was not in on the gags, he did not share in the trifles and the traditions. He was new in the outfit. A replacement." "They talked afterwards of how the blood was spurting from the new guy in all directions, how he never uttered a cry of pain, and how, when he finally gave in, he did it quietly. They wondered then who he was and where he was from. What he was like and why he was here. But no one had the answers. They didn't know his first name. They were not sure where he was from. Most only knew his last name cause it was stenciled on his shirt." [From a news article by Tom Thiede] Years later the men would rack their brains trying to recall the names. They could see the faces, they remembered well the details of the death. Some could recall the time of day, even the date, and what the weather was like. But no one could remember the names! March 1966 was also a month of working on, expanding upon and improving the defensive perimeter of the Cu Chi base camp. An 8 foot long Monitor Lizard was finally shot and killed in the Ben Muong. The creature had been spotted on occasion and soldiers were extremely watchful when wading across the stream or when working near it. On March 04, 1966, the 1/5th(M) and the 2/27th Infantry conducted a one day search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Xom Moi , Giong Viec and Ba Xa, all located some 1500 meters NE of Cu Chi and along a dirt road marked on the map as Highway 237. There were no friendly casualties suffered by the 1/5th(M) during the operation and all members were commended for the maximum destruction of enemy equipment and structures. Numerous booby traps and dud rounds of various types were also found and destroyed. The soldiers of the battalion were learning more and more about the booby traps used by the VC. There were the hand grenades with trip wire; the unexploded cluster bomb units rigged with tip wire; the Chicom Claymore designed to explode in a 360 degree circle, the artillery and bomb duds, rigged to be tripped or command detonated. They were in the ground, on the ground, hung in trees or bamboo clusters, ankle high, knee high, waist high, head high or higher. You would find them on trails or footpaths. They could be encountered in tunnels or attached to spider hole covers. One was even found attached to a pineapple growing in a garden. And there were the sharpened bamboo sticks, referred to as punji stakes. All were designed to damage the human body. They were not everywhere, all the time, but they were around. There was a road that ran from the village of Cu Chi, through the base camp, across the Ben Muong, and then through the Filhol – Balancie Rubber Plantations to the village of Phu Hoa Dong where it linked up with Highway 15. The portion of the dirt road through the plantations had not seen motor vehicle traffic for some time and was overgrown with vegetation. The bridge at the Ben Muong had been destroyed and in March of 1966 the engineers of the 25th Infantry Division completed construction of a new one. This bridge would allow direct access to the area north of the base camp by tracked vehicles. The bridge was in the 1/5th(M)’s sector of the perimeter and the battalion was given the job of providing security for it. This was accomplished by establishing a platoon size combat out post located just to the north of the bridge on the southern edge of the rubber plantation. The area directly north of the outpost was made up of three rubber plantations. The Filhol, the Balancie, and the Liocara. But the area was soon referred to simply as “the Filhol” by the soldiers of the battalion. Ann Margret was the name initially given to the combat outpost by some of the officers and it stuck with the troops. From March 14 thru 19, 1966 the 1/5th(M) participated in a search and destroy operation, the first phase of which was located in the general area southwest of Bao Trai (XT 5204) near the Oriental River. The units of the battalion crossed the LD [line of departure] at 1000 hours on March 14, 1966 and encountered light enemy contact. Some APCs got stuck in the soft ground as they approached to within 1000 to 1500 meters of the Oriental River. The battalion then continued the operation dismounted. The battalion spent the night of March 14 in the vicinity of XT 483023. One man was wounded when he attempted to throw a captured booby-trapped hand grenade into a canal. He pulled the pin and threw the grenade but it had been short-fused and immediately exploded. Light enemy contact was made on the morning of March 15th as the companies moved to and searched various objective areas. At 1507 hours Company C received SA fire and at the same time a booby trap was detonated. The encounter resulted in 4 Bobcats wounded and 1 killed. Sporadic contact continued through the day and by 2045 hours all units closed in the vicinity of XT 5202. At 0710 hours, on March 17th the battalion, now mounted, moved north to an area of operations west of the junction of Highways10 and 6A, towards the Oriental River. Anti-tank mines and booby traps were encountered throughout the day. On March 18, 1966, the battalion continued to search the area. Tunnel networks and booby traps and mines were again encountered. Several Bobcats were wounded and 1 was killed. On March 19, 1966, there was light enemy contact. By 1930 hours all units had closed back to Cu Chi Base Camp. On March 28, 1966, the 25th Infantry Division command group arrived at Cu Chi Base Camp. From March 29, 1966 to April 05, 1966 the 1/5th(M) participated in a four battalion search and destroy operation which began in the Filhol and continued into the Ho Bo Woods (XT 6229). The men of the battalion were still adjusting. Changes were made to the APCs. Sandbags were put around the cargo hatch opening to offer a little better protection to soldiers fighting from the tracks. The M-60 machine gun mounting post was removed from the track and the gun was employed from the side of the cargo hatch using the sandbags as a gun rest. In the initial phase of the operation on March 29, the 1/5th (M) moved through the rubber plantation and established blocking positions to prevent movement in or out of the village of Phu Hoa Dong. The 7th ARVN Regiment then conducted search operations throughout the entire village area. There was light enemy contact throughout the day. Night ambushes were of course employed, and they met with some success. On the next day the units conducted a search of the local area. Numerous supply caches and tunnel systems were located. On March 31, 1966 the battalion enlarged the area of its search and destroy operations. Enemy contact was again sporadic and more tunnel systems and enemy supplies were located. Blocking positions around Phu Hoa Dong continued into the 1st of April and that afternoon the battalion made preparations to move into the Ho Bo Woods area. During March 1966 , two Bobcats died in Viet Nam. They were: George E. Snodgrass and Daniel G. Stands Jr. A major malfunction of the M-16 Rifle started to appear amongst soldiers in Viet Nam. The rifle would fire, but the extractor would be unable to remove the spent cartridge from the chamber of the rifle. A rod would then have to be inserted down the barrel and the spent cartridge would have to be “punched” out of the chamber. Initially, it was related that the soldiers were not clearning their weapons properly and this was the cause of the jamming. Then it was stated that the weapon needed a new buffer system to correct the problem. Next the barrel chamber was crome plated to reduce fouling friction. Then the barrel twists were changed and a bolt closure device was installed. And the weapon kept jamming. And the department of the Army fell back to saying that the soldier was not keeping the weapon properly cleaned. Bullshit. We cleaned the damn things. We over-cleaned them, if there is such a thing. When your life and the lives of those around you depend upon a weapon, you take care of that weapon. But nothing seemed to solve the problem. They kept jamming all through 1966 and into 1967. Finally, a Congressional Sub-Committee held hearings on the problem in 1967 and concluded that the rifle was initially provided with a cartridge containing IMR Propellant and worked fine. Then the Army Munitions Command contracted with Olin Mathieson to produce the powder for the cartridge and they in turn supplied Ball Propellant, which was cheaper to manufacture. Ball Propellant burned faster and increased the cyclic rate of fire in the M-16 Rifle. According to the weapons inventor, Eugene Stoner, this was a worst case senerio for the weapon and was THE cause of the “failure to extract” jamming malfunction. Furture ammunition was made with IMR Powder and the jamming problem disappeared as the Ball Propellant ammunition was replaced. The Rifle and the Myth Congressional Sub-Committee held hearings on the problem in 1967 Map 5 Northern Ho Bo Woods and Southern Ho Bo Map 6 Northern Filhol and Southern Ho Bo. At 0730 hours on April 2, 1966, the battalion units moved along assigned routes to predetermined objective areas. Troop A, ¾ Cavalry was attached to the 1/5th(M) and Company C 1/5th(M) was OPCON to the 1/69th Armor. Company C had 2 APCs bog down and during the extrication process one Bobcat was shot and killed. Upon moving to a secondary objective, Company A had an APC destroyed by a command detonated 175mm Arty round at 1730 hours. A second was damaged by another mine. The 1st APC was flipped over onto its top and resulted in 4 Bobcats killed and 4 wounded. Two Vietnamese National Policemen were also wounded. Three Bobcats were wounded on the 2nd APC. One of the men described it as one hectic evening and night. “The command detonated mine blew the track up and over onto its back, killing four and seriously wounding others. When I got there the track commander, who was seriously wounded, was determined to ‘call in my own damn dust off.’ Due to enemy contact we had to strip the track, evac the wounded and pull back for the night. We were in contact all night long ¼ then recovered the A5 in the am ... finding our cook, KIA, beneath the track.” Numerous tunnel systems and assorted fortifications were discovered in the area along with some caches of various supplies and equipment. “There were so many houses and tunnels that they couldn’t be effectively covered in a week’s time;” and “The area is honeycombed” were some of the reports being transmitted over the radio. On April 3, 1966, the battalion task force continued a detailed search of the area. Tunnel systems, supply caches and numerous booby traps were encountered. Enemy contact was light. Co B had an APC detonate a mine, the explosion of which ignited the gas tank, resulting in one Bobcat being killed and 4 wounded in the vicinity of XT 655270. Some of the men started referring to the area as the “Christmas Tree” because it was ‘decorated’ with so many booby traps and mines. On April 4, 1966, Company C returned to battalion control and Troop A, ¾ Cav went OPCON to the 1/69th Armor. Company C also reported that on April 3rd while OPCON to the 1/69th, they had 3 Bobcats killed and 13 wounded. The battalion continued its search and destroy mission in the area. A very large cache of polished rice was located along with several smaller ones in well concealed and booby-trapped areas. There were several skirmishes during the day resulting in one Bobcat killed. Among the wounded were 7 men who were badly burned when there was an internal explosion and fire on one of the 4.2 inch mortar tracks. At 0900 hours on April 5, 1966, Company B and the Recon Platoon were committed to assist the 2/27th Infantry, whose A Company had been attacked in their night defensive perimeter in the Ho Bo Woods by the 1st Battalion, 165A VC Regiment. Later in the day they were assigned to assist the return movement of the Brigade Command Group from Trung Lap. All units closed into Cu Chi Base Camp by 1630 hours with no enemy contact, ending the operation. The battalion reported VC killed by body count during the operation and a large amount of enemy supplies and equipment were located. Estimates were also reported on the number of enemy soldiers probably or possibly killed. It was becoming apparent to the men of the battalion that this was to be a war of numbers. How many, how much. It was not sufficient to report that some small arms ammunition was located. It was required that the number of rounds, the caliber, and make of the rounds be reported. It soon got to a point where units were reporting the “capture” of a single, rubber sandal, or ¼ pound of documents, or a pair of gloves, amongst the items found on the various operations. Enemy body count was also being emphasized, big time! Initially some incentives were experimented with, as if the war were some sort of contest which was winnable by whichever side scored the highest number. In the beginning of April 1966, one company had a policy in effect where if a soldier killed a Viet Cong and his body and weapon were recovered, he was entitled to a three day pass to Saigon. Another had a liberal policy as to letting the men keep the weapons of any killed VC. Their were also the friendly losses, as the casualties of war were by no means a one sided event. On April 6, 1966, one of the men burned in the 4.2 inch mortar track fire on April 4th died of his injuries. On April 7, 1966, the 1/5th(M)(-), supported by Troop B, ¾ Cavalry and Company C of the 1/69th Armor and Company A, 1/27th Infantry, participated in phase one of a search and destroy mission of the Phuoc Vinh Ninh area, located southeast of Cu Chi Base Camp at XT 6814. There was sporadic enemy contact during the sweep of the area. Numerous booby traps and mines were encountered. Eight men were wounded by mines and booby traps. On April 8, 1966, a platoon from Company B conducted a reconnaissance into the Filhol. "What I seem to recall," the platoon leader later recollected, "was that it was less than a platoon size recon. After finishing the recon (we had seen a lot of indication of traffic on one trail) I called in and asked for permission to set an ambush for a while and see what happened. I believe I remember springing the ambush quite a few times, maybe four or five. Each encounter was with a small group, 2-4 individuals. Most would not surrender when challenged and although armed, would run and be shot. Each time we would take some branches and clean up the blood on the dusty trail and reset the ambush." "I do recall there being captives and I do remember one was a young woman who was detained behind the platoon position where we had the tracks. I definitely remember going back there when I heard a commotion and found several guys preparing to rape her. I put a stop to that." Soldiers are a reflection of the society that produces them. Thus in the military, as in society in general, there are thieves, rapists, murderers, sadists, alcoholics and drug abusers. And there are men of honor and principle and deep religious beliefs. As in society, the latter far outnumber the former. And there are rules and laws that must be followed, even during war. The officers and NCOs usually did a good job in making sure those rules and laws were followed. And there was a system in place to punish those who violated or disobeyed. On April 9, 1966, Company B dropped off a dismounted platoon sized daylight ambush in the Filhol. The remainder of the company, then conducted a reconnaissance of the area to the north west and stumbled onto an entrenched company size VC force. During the 45 minute fire fight which followed, one of the APC’s was hit twice with 57mm recoilless rifle rounds. Company A and C were dispatched into the area to assist in a further search of the enemy who had fled the trench line after having enough. Later in the afternoon an APC from Company B, driving through the thick vegetation fell into a deep gully and turned over onto its top and caught fire. Somehow there were no casualties in the incident and no fatalities during the day’s activities. All units closed back into Cu Chi Base Camp by 1800 hours. On April 13, 1966, the 25th Division PX commenced operations at the Cu Chi base camp. The major facility was established with a warehouse and sub-exchanges were to be established in subordinate units. On April 13th, the 1st Bn(M) 5th Inf began a two day search and destroy operation in the Filhol. C Company (-) of the 1/69th Armor was attached to the battalion along with 1 platoon of the 65th Engineers. The battalion task force was divided into three teams and a command group. At 0630 hours, all elements departed Cu Chi Base Camp through OP Ann Margret and the teams secured their respective objectives without opposition. The battalion command group established a task force forward base in the vicinity of XT 647207. As the teams conducted searches of their areas throughout the day, 7 APCs, 3 tanks and 1 VTR struck mines. 1 tank was struck by an RPG-2 round that penetrated through the tank and caused 1 minor injury. This was the first time that a tank of the 25th Division had been hit with an RPG round. Company B encountered a small group of VC in spider holes and tunnels who, by the use of snipers and rifle grenades, killed 5 and wounded 7 members of the company. The other teams suffered light casualties in scattered encounters. Companies A and C and the Recon Platoon closed into the battalion night base camp. B Company established its own perimeter as it was providing security for three tanks which had become mired and were not extracted until 2300 hours. On April 14, 1966 the companies continued the search of the area between the Filhol and the Ho Bo Woods. Light contact was made and mines and booby traps were again encountered. At 0950 hours, Company B received small arms fire resulting in 1 man killed. At 1535 hours, Company A discovered a rice cache. In the process of checking it, a booby trap was detonated and 1 Bobcat was killed and two were wounded. By 1900 hours all elements had closed Cu Chi Base Camp. During the operation VC had been killed and 68 short tunnels, 41 bunkers and various amounts of weapons, munitions, equipment and supplies were seized or destroyed. 8 APCs, 2 tanks and 1 TVR had been damaged by AT mines and 2 tanks were damaged by AT weapons. 7 Bobcats died and 27 were wounded. FromApril 16th thru the 21st the 1/5th(M), along with the 1/27th Infantry and the 2/27th Infantry, participated in a 2nd Brigade search and destroy operation northeast of Trang Bang. The operation consisted of daytime sweeps and night-time saturation ambushes. On April 23, 1966, the 3rd Platoon of Company C departed Cu Chi base camp at 0720 hours for a mounted patrol into the Filhol. At 1045 hours they reported that 1 man had been killed by sniper fire near XT 696196. At 1600 hours the platoon returned to Cu Chi Base Camp with the one Bobcat KIA. During the day a sergeant from Company B was conducting a class on the use of the Claymore anti-personnel mine in the battalion motor pool. The group was inside an APC with the rear ramp in the down position. One of the B Company mechanics said he had just walked past the track when there was an explosion. Somehow the claymore had detonated. Two men were killed outright and several were wounded. The mechanic related that there were putting people on jeeps and ¾ ton trucks and rushing them to the hospital area. “It was a bloody mess,” he related. On April 27, 1966 one of the Bobcats wounded in the Claymore class incident died of his wounds. On April 30, 1966, the main body of the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade arrived at Cu Chi Base Camp. During April 1966, 24 Bobcats died in Viet Nam. They were: Jesse J. Coffey; Curtis E. Dorris; George S. Franklin; Keith L. Shipp; Lester J. Thornell; Jimmy B. Taylor; Larry J. Nichols; Hamp J. Sykes Jr. ; Johnny B. Boston; Roger D. Jarrell; Arthur C. Morris Jr.; Steven M. Smith; Donald R. Brown; Green Conley ; Frank A. D’Amico ; Clinton B. Fackrell ; Phillips LaMarr; James R. Taylor; Lewis M. Thomas; Howard E. Rothring Jr.; Francisco Correa-Morales; John P. Isaacs; Walter J. Type and ONE whose name is unknown to us who are writing this work. 1. Donald Ray Johnson 2. John Parnella Map 7 Trang Bang and Go Dau Ha. Map 8 Trang Bang north to Suoi Cao. Casualties for the 25th Infantry Division(-) during the period of January 1, 1966 thru April 30, 1966 were: 91 KIA(killed in action), 914 WIA(wounded in action), 0 MIA(missing in action), 17 DOW(died of wounds), and 12 NBD(non-battle deaths). There was a small outbreak of Bacillary Dysentery within the 1/5th Inf(M), which was classified as from a filth borne source. Whether from water, nonpotable ice or food handler was never confirmed. It was also noted that the burn out of human wastes collected in the half drums using diesel fuel had not proven totally satisfactory as some residue always remained and the disposal of the residue had created some problems. There was nothing like the smell of burning shit in the morning to arouse the senses. Although there were some base camp growing pains, the engineer battalion managed to establish the camp to a class II configuration in less than 45 days. From May 1, 1966 thru May 11th, the 1/5th(M) and Company C, 1/69th Armor participated in providing security for engineer operations on Hwy 1 and Hwy 22 in the vicinity of Go Dau Ha. On May 5, 1966, another of the Bobcats wounded in the Claymore class incident in April died of wounds received. On May 7, 1966, Company B, with one platoon of tanks attached, conducted a one day reconnaissance operation in the southern Boi Loi Woods code named “Sitting Bull.” At 1205 hours, the force engaged some VC in a trench line. At the end of the engagement 1 Bobcat was killed and 22 were wounded. 12 of the WIAs were evacuated and the others were treated and returned to duty.